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The Revival
of the Rust Belt
by Murray L. Weidenbaum
and Michael J. Athey

Are America's basic industries, pressured by overwhelming import competition, becoming an anachronistic "Rust Belt"? Must
government step in to assure the survival of older, heavy industries, especially in the Midwest? Are we becoming a service economy focusing on information, hamburgers, and dress shops?
The facts available to answer these questions are undramatic,
not supportive of any extreme position, and thus uncompetitive in
the marketplace for public policy viewpoints. The truth of the matter is that some of this nation's heavy industry is no longer competitive and is in the process of shrinking in size and importance;
steel and automobile companies have reported the most dramatic
cutbacks. Yet, on balance, the answer to each of the questions is a
clear "no." If there is a "Rust Belt," it is far more a question of perception than reality.

Dr. Murray L. Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University
Professor and Director of the Center for the Study of American Business
at Washington University in St. Louis. Michael J. Athey is John M. Olin
Fellow research assistant at the Center. This report was originally
published as "What Is the Rust Belt's Problem?" Chapter 6 in The Industrial Policy Debate, Chalmers Johnson, ed. (1984). Reprinted by permission of ICS Press, Institute for Contemporary Studies, Suite 750,
785 Market St., San Francisco, CA 94103.

By and large, American manufacturing companies-hard goods
and soft goods producers alike-are holding their own while adjusting to the business cycle. As can be seen in figure 1, both durable and nondurable manufacturing sectors in the United States
have recovered from the 1981-82 recession. By December 1983,
total industrial production had attained an all-time peak.
In view of these facts, how do we account for the gloom-anddoom talk about the sad prospects for U.S. manufacturing industries? First of all, the casual observer tends to generalize from a
few highly publicized instances of true distress. Moreover, the
positive side of economic events is rarely considered newsworthy
and thus escapes widespread public attention.

But, perhaps most important, the authors of the new gospel of
industrial policy-as well as other "megatrend" thinkers-have
fallen into one of the oldest analytical traps. They have drawn
heroic and long-term conclusions from the most recent data that
they have seen. Many of the gloom-and-doom soothsayers were
doing their writing in 1981 or 1982 when the economy was declining and, in a simpleminded fashion, they merely extrapolated that
decline into the future. Such action is on a par with reacting to the
spring rains by rebuilding Noah's ark.
However, to react with euphoria to news of the upturn is, of
course, as silly as treating the downside of a business cycle as a
fundamental and lasting new development. It is intriguing to note
that some observers at the conservative end of the political
spectrum are beginning to do just that. To write about the runaway boom of the 1980s is also misleading because it sets up unattainable expectations.
It is useful to examine the trend of output in key sectors of the
American economy. As shown in table 1, total durable goods production dropped 11 percent from 1981 to 1982. Smaller declines
occurred in the broader aggregates, such as all manufacturing and
total industrial production. All three aggregate measures, however, remained substantially above the levels of the 1970s. The
point is not to underestimate the severity of the recent recession.
Rather, it is to perceive the underlying strength of the American
economy.
When we examine individual industry groups, we find a more
diverse pattern. For example, primary metals (including steel)
took a bad tumble, declining by 31 percent between 1981 and
1982. In contrast, transportation equipment (which covers both
automotive and aerospace production) was down by 9 percent and
instrument producers (a heavily defense-oriented sector) reported
a 5 percent drop.
Of greater interest is the nature of the snapback in 1983. Two
industry groups exceeded their 1981 highs: electrical machinery
and transportation equipment. At the other end of the spectrum of
performance, the 1983 recovery in primary metals (up 15 percent)
did not bring that industry back to its 1975 level of output.
Nevertheless, taking full account of the variations among industries, it seems clear that the decline in heavy manufacturing in-
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Figure 1
Trend of U.S. Manufacturing Output
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Analytical Traps

dustries that was so noticeable in 1982 did not represent a new
and durable long-term trend. Rather, the decline was primarily
the result of a severe but short-term cyclical contraction.
This report focuses on output as the prime indicator of the economic performance of business firms. Yet there is a great amount
of interest in employment. It is the high levels of unemployment
that exacerbate pressures for restricting imports and for providing federal bailouts of domestic corporations. However, public discussions rarely acknowledge the relationship between production,
job creation, and productivity. That is, in an economy with rising
productivity (technically, output per worker hour), we would expect that employment rises more slowly than does output. In fact,
instances of slowly growing or stable output might be accompanied by declining employment. That is, declining employment
does not automatically and inevitably imply declining production.
And the health of an industry is determined not by its demand for
inputs (labor, capital, etc.) but by its supply of output-by its contribution of goods and services to the society's standard of living.
It can be seen in table 2 that total manufacturing employment
in the United States has fluctuated in the range of 18 to 20 million
since 1970; 1982's performance, although low, was merely at the
bottom end of the range. The decline that year was followed by an
expansion in 1983 that extended to every major hard goods sector.
These statistics clearly do not support a counsel of despair.

tOOtO.-iOOO'ltO
OONOOIO.-ilO"'
.-i .-i .-i .-i .-i .-i

tOtOc;nc:ntONIO
t-.-itO-.:!'OtON
.-i .-i .-i .-i .-i .-i

OOtOOO.-itOO.-i
O"'t-t-...-it--.:1'
.-i .-i .-i .-i .-i .-i .-i

N-.:!'"'"'t-.-itO"'t-C.O.-it-"'
.-i .-i .-i .-i .-i .-i .-i

tOOt-tOt-Nc:n
O'l.-i.-iNO'l"'O
.-i .-i .-i
.-i .-i

t-NOO-.:!'ONN
OOOOO'l.-iO
.-i .-i .-i .-i
.-i .-i

00
0

.-i

:g
0
·~:

tiS

Statistical Analysis of U.S. Manufacturing, 1970-82

>

The burst of concern about the decline of U.S. manufacturing has
focused on the older, low-tech industries often referred to collectively as the "Rust Belt." Let us see what the facts are. We divide
the industries into two groups: high-tech and low-tech. 1 We do this
by ranking manufacturing industries by the ratio of their R&D
expenditures to sales. The high-tech industries are those whose
ratio exceeds the average for all manufacturing in 1980. The lowtech sectors are those with R&D-to-sales ratios below this
average. 2
We now turn to the question "Is there a Rust Belt that is in
decline?" To answer this, we examine the most comprehensive
body of data available, the statistics on income produced by two4
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digit manufacturing industry, as reported in the national income
and product accounts for the period 1970-82. 3 On the basis of
econometric analysis, we group each industry into one of the
following three categories: (1) those that showed a rising trend in
output over the period, (2) those that showed a stable trend, and
(3) those that showed a declining trend. Results for the period are
presented in table 3. 4
As can be seen, there is no statistical support for the claim that
the low-tech industries are declining or, as a group, even reaching
a period of stagnation or stability. Why, then, do so many commentators contend that low-tech industries are declining? We suggest
three possibilities: (1) they draw long-term conclusions from the
data for the last few years, (2) they equate trends in employment
in an industry with its overall health, or (3) they implicitly define
"declining" as growing more slowly than the rest of the economy.

C'\IC'I:l....--.:1'0....-t-.:1'....-c:nO')O....-oo
...-t00-.:1'0')t-...,....;-,....;-C'.f...-~,....;-

(j)OQC'\It-1.0000
C'I':)ICOI.Q...-1.000
...--.:1't-Ot-I.Ot0
,....;-,....;-,....;-C'.f,....;-

Table 3
Trend in Real Income Produced
by Industry, 1970-82
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Trend in
output

High-tech
industries

Low-tech
industries

Growth

Machinery, except electrical
Electric and electronic
equipment
Other transportation
equipment
Instruments and related
products
Chemicals and allied products

Lumber and wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Stone, clay, and glass products
Fabricated metal products
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Food and kindred products
Tobacco manufacturing
Textile mill products
Apparel and other textile
products
Paper and allied products
Printing and publishing
Petroleum and coal products
Rubber and miscellaneous
plastic products

Stability

Motor vehicles and equipment

Leather and leather products
Primary metal industries

Decline

None

None
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Source: Murray L. Weidenbaum and Michael J. Athey, "The 'Decline' of U.S.
Manufacturing: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications" (St. Louis: Center for
the Study of American Business, Working Paper no. 87, 1984).
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The business cycle rediscovered. The period from 1970 to
1982 was a time of major economic disruptions. With supply
shocks from the rapid rise in food exports and an oil embargo
followed by a dramatic rise in oil prices, the U.S. economy was subjected to wide swings and deep recessions in 1973-75, 1980, and
1981-82.
The majority of two-digit manufacturing industries followed
this same pattern. In the 1950s and 1960s, they showed a
relatively stable upward trend, taking in stride the recessions that
occurred during this time. This, however, was not the case in the
1970s and early 1980s. In the face of severe recessions, the
manufacturing industries experienced much deeper and longer
declines than in the earlier period. This is the environment from
which the proponents of an industrial policy have developed their
arguments.
Focusing our attention on the period 1981-82, we see all the industries suffering what appears to be a significant decline. But, on
reflection, when the economy goes through a recession it is not
surprising to see the manufacturing industries decline more than
proportionately. The other side of the coin, however, is that in
1983 these same industries recovered from the recession more
rapidly than the rest of the economy. Thus, historical data do not
support the conclusion that the low-tech industries are declining.

Table4
Trend in Employment by Industry, 1970-82
Trend in
employment

High-tech
industries

Low-tech
industries

Growth

Machinery, except electrical
Electric and electronic
equipment
Instruments and related
products
Chemicals and allied products

Furniture and fixtures
Printing and publishing
Petroleum and coal products
Rubber and miscellaneous
plastic products

Stability

Motor vehicles and equipment
Other transportation
equipment

Stone, clay, and glass products
Fabricated metal products
Food and kindred products
Paper and allied products
Lumber and wood products

Decline

None

Primary metal industries
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Tobacco manufacturing
Textile mill products
Apparel and other textile
products
Leather and leather products

Source: Murray L. Weidenbaum and Michael J. Athey, "The 'Decline' of U.S.
Manufacturing: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications" (St. Louis: Center for
the Study of American Business, Working Paper no. 87, 1984).

Is employment the problem? To many people, an upward
trend in employment is a sign of a healthy and growing industry.
All but two of the high-tech industries experienced growth in
employment over the period 1970 to 1982 (see table 4). 5 Thus,
there is some logic in taking the trend in job creation in those industries as a rough approximation of general growth.
When the same analysis is made for the low-tech industries, we
obtain more mixed results. Six of the fifteen low-tech industries
show declining trends in employment, while only four industries
demonstrate signs of growth.
The question that must be addressed, however, is whether or
not it is necessarily true that an industry that is reducing its labor
force is truly a declining industry. This proposition-which underlies so much of the popular writing on industrial policy-does
not necessarily hold. Surely an industry whose output is declining

is also likely to be reducing employment. Yet there are other
reasons why employment may be decreasing. Referring back to
table 3, we recall that most of the industries have been growing
in terms of output, and the three exceptions are holding their
own. This means that most of those industries that are declining
in terms of employment are at the same time increasing their
productivity.
More aggregate analyses show that, in each of the past six
recoveries, a higher level of manufacturing output has been attained with fewer workers working fewer hours. This is primarily
a result of the long-term trend in productivity growth, combined
with the cyclical effects of overhead reduction and the closing of
the least efficient production facilities. 6
The relevant point is that employment problems may arise when
a healthy industry is merely adjusting to changes in its environ-
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ment. That is, many of the industries classified here as low-tech are
becoming more automated in order to compete and survive in the
marketplace. In many specific instances, company investments in
new productive equipment have increased the productivity of individual workers and thus reduced the demand for total employment. For example, in the textile industry, lasers inspect 10,000
yards of cloth an hour-fifteen times faster than a human once
could. In the steel industry, lasers and innovative sensing devices
perform inspections and even check refractory lining wear in steelmaking furnaces. 7 Economizing on labor costs, of course, can be a
key to maintaining an industry's competitiveness.

The manufacturing sector relative to the economy. Some
of those who worry that low-tech industries are declining do not
focus on decreases in output in an absolute sense. They consider
an industry's performance to be unsatisfactory if it is not growing
at least as rapidly as the economy as a whole. Hence, if the lowtech industries are declining according to this definition, we
should observe over the period 1970 to 1982 a significant negative
trend in the ratio of industry income to national income.
To test this hypothesis, we use a statistical methodology similar
to that developed for table 3. 8 In table 5, we see that high-tech industries have been growing at least as fast as the economy, two at
a faster rate. That should come as no surprise. What about the
low-tech industries? According to the proposition being examined,
we should expect that these industries would demonstrate slower
growth than the national average, or even a decline. This is true of
some but not all. Five of the fifteen industries are growing less
rapidly than the economy as a whole. However, such industries as
tobacco manufacturing and petroleum and coal products have
been growing faster than the economy. Hence, any tendency for
low-tech industries to grow more slowly than the economy is by no
means universal.
In short, the data on national income by industry, when viewed
in real terms during the period from 1970 to 1982, do not support
the claim that the old-time industries located in America's "Rust
Belt" are going the way of the dinosaur. 9 All of the industries, both
high-tech and low-tech, show at least stability over this period,
with no examples of industries with absolute long-term declines in
levels of output.
10

Table 5
Industry Growth Patterns Compared
to the National Average,
1970-82
Low-tech
industries

High-tech
industries

Trend
Growing
faster than
national
income

Machinery, except electrical
Instruments and related
products

Tobacco manufacturing
Petroleum and coal products

Growing at
about the
same rate

Electric and electronic
equipment
Other transportation
equipment
Motor vehicles and equipment
Chemicals and allied products

Lumber and wood
products
Stone, clay, and glass products
Primary metal industries
Fabricated metal products
Food and kindred products
Paper and allied products
Printing and publishing
Rubber and miscellaneous
plastic products
Furniture and fixtures
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Textile mill products
Apparel and other textile
products
Leather and leather products

Growing
None
more slowly or
declining

Source: Murray L. Weidenbaum and Michael J. Athey, "The 'Decline' of U.S.
Manufacturing: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications" (St. Louis: Center for
the Study of American Business, Working Paper no. 87, 1984).

Shortcomings of Existing Industrial Policy
In the debate on industrial policy proposals, it is important to note
that many existing government policies affect industry in important ways and often have contributed to the difficulties faced by
the manufacturing sector. These negative impacts of government
action are, in the main, side effects of laws designed for other purposes: providing a more equitable tax structure, redistributing income and wealth, enhancing the quality of life, improving the
physical environment, and so forth.
Intentionally or not, many of these policies have weakened the
manufacturing sector of the economy, either by increasing its
costs or by reducing the amount of capital available for expansion
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and for new product development. This influence on the fundamental structure of American industry can be seen as manufacturing companies shift portions of their work force away from the
creative and productive areas of business such as R&D, manufacturing, and marketing. The result has been an increase in overhead functions such as legal activities, accounting and finance,
public affairs, and government relations.l° For the individual firm,
changes in the corporate work force may be essential to respond to
pressures from government agencies and self-styled public interest groups. But the effect of these shifts on national productivity and competitiveness is negative. Poorer industrial performance, in turn, leads to calls for an industrial policy.
If we overlook these structural responses to existing governmental policy, all that is visible are pleas for bailouts, subsidies,
and other special assistance. But, on reflection, the willingness of
government to bail out a Lockheed or a Chrysler is not surprising.
It is the price that Congress pays to avoid dealing with the underlying industrial problems that arise from the present pattern
of governmental intervention in the economy.
A focal point for the current advocates of industrial policy is the
proposed reestablishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), sometimes under a more euphonious name such as a
"national development bank." Attention is usually focused on the
contributions that the RFC made during the Great Depression of
the 1930s and World War II. Yet, most of its loans to business were
made in the postwar boom period of the late 1940s and early
1950s.
There is much to learn from the operations of the RFC. Its history shows that government subsidy of business encourages a
misallocation of resources and provides opportunity for political
favoritism. The RFC experience also demonstrates that government programs develop a life of their own and persist long after
the problems for which they were created have been solved.l 1
Variations on the negative theme of propping up the economy's
"losers" are not limited to the notion of bringing back the RFC.
Some would attempt to stop economic change by dealing with the
so-called "runaway plant problem"; their response is to make it extremely difficult and costly to move or close down an industrial
facility. This "King Canute" approach ignores the reasons why

he simple-minded dichotomy that sees only expanding hightech and declining low-tech industries needs to be examined
more carefully than has been done by the widely publicized prognosticators of the demise of traditional industry. If industrial
giants of the past such as Andrew Carnegie and Harvey Firestone
were to visit their old companies, they would be pleasantly
surprised by the array of high technology now in use: industrial
robots, sophisticated process control, laser inspection, flexible
manufacturing systems (FMS), automated material handling,
and CAD/CAM (computer-aided design along with computer-aided
manufacturing) .12
Deere & Company's sprawling tractor works provides a good example. The facility includes four FMS installations and sixteen
machining centers-groups of totally automated machines and
conveyors linked to a computer. In addition, visitors can see
robotic welding and robotic spray painting with computers providing total integration of conveyors, towlines, monorails, cranes, and
automated storage and retrieval systems. There is hardly a conventional forklift truck in sight.
Many companies have adopted "flexible manufacturing," a
high-tech marriage of robots and computers. Deere's plant can
turn out tractors in more than 5,000 configurations. General
Electric now makes 2,000 versions of its basic electric meter at a
single small plant.l 3 In a new facility, General Motors has installed a robot system that paints its cars. The man-machine in-
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companies are forced to take such actions in the first place. Frequently, in fact, those plants have lost their competitiveness due in
large part to the government policies advocated by the same groups
that now support legislation against runaway plants. Proposals also
overlook the negative signals that would be sent to any company
considering building a new plant in a region that had adopted
restrictive legislation (and a few states already have done so).
Close cousins of this negative approach are proposals to "protect" various industries and markets from foreign competition
and to inhibit American investments overseas. None of these approaches would lead to a more productive or more competitive
economy. They often would shelter companies and localities from
their own mistakes.

T

All this, however, need not lead to a do-nothing approach to the
serious economic questions that face the United States. There is a
growth strategy that involves no expansion in government power
or federal spending. Its elements are basic: tax simplification,

regulatory relief, lower deficit financing, and curtailed government lending. In each of these areas, much can be done.
The 1981 tax reductions were surely helpful. But the sad fact of
the matter is that the tax code is far more complicated today than
it was just a few years ago. To anyone who has ever tried to fill out
the tax forms for a small company, it is clear that simplification is
not just a pleasant thought, but rather a vitally important need.
Similarly, the regulatory relief effort has accomplished much in
reducing the burden of new rules. But fundamental improvement
can come only from revising existing statutes that mandate
unreasonable burdens of compliance, such as the "zero discharge"
goal of the Clean Water Act and the "zero risk" provision of the
Delaney Amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Furthermore, it is ironic to contemplate the numerous industrial policy proposals for funneling federal funds to "worthy"
private investment areas at a time when the federal government
is running budget deficits in the neighborhood of $200 billion a
year. The most effective way to increase private capital formation
is just the reverse of the RFC approach-to reduce the federal
drain on private saving represented by massive deficit financing.
Finally, federal lending programs are a classic example of robbing
Peter to pay-or lend to-Paul. They do nothing to increase the
pool of private saving. But they do reduce the amount available in
the private market.
The most effective strategy for encouraging economic growth is
no secret: it is to reduce government barriers and achieve a betterfunctioning market economy. However, this approach is not accompanied by any guarantee. In a truly dynamic, competitive
economy, we do not know in advance where the new product
breakthroughs will occur. And the benefits will not be evenly distributed. But we do know that society as a whole will be better off,
since it is likely that most-though not all-industrial workers
and employers will enjoy higher real incomes and improved living
standards.
Surely positive public policy should enhance productivity,
capital formation, and international competitiveness. The negative approaches embodied in most industrial policy suggestions,
which extend further the role of government in the economy, are
all adverse to these key economic goals. Given the gap between
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terface is being redefined. Manual operations using gears, pulleys,
and belts have often been replaced by microprocessors, keyboards,
electronic switches, and cathode ray tubes.
It is ironic that, just when the promoters of industrial policy in
the United States are bemoaning the effects of reliance on free
markets, writers in the USSR are blaming that nation's poor economic performance on the centralized nature of the Soviet state.
Here are some of the "outdated ... peculiarities of the system of
state economic management" that Soviet economists bemoan:
• "a very high degree of centralization in economic decisionmaking''
• "the inhibition of market forces"
• "a centralized system of allocation of materials and supplies to
all enterprises"
• "the centralized regulation of all forms of material incentives
for workers"
• "overlapping authority and resulting confusion among ministries and agencies"
• "the limited economic authority and, as a result, the limited
economic liability of enterprises for the results of their economic performance"I 4
It is intriguing to read the Soviets' own description of how individuals attempt to adjust to this "most rigid regimentation of
economic behavior":
The population always enjoys a certain amount of freedom to respond to
the limitations imposed by the state .... When established rules and
regulation ... affect the vital interests of certain categories of people,
they look for ways to circumvent the constraints and satisfy their requirements. Then the state introduces still harsher measures to block
undesirable forms of activity, in response to which the population comes
up with more refined methods that make it possible to meet their interests under the new conditions. 15

I
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the ideal embodied in most policy proposals and the shortcomings
of actual practice, a cynic would perhaps conclude that the optimum amount of change in government actions directed toward
the industrial economy is zero.

1. The categories are at the two-digit level of aggregation. See U.S. Office of Management
and Budget, Standard Industrial Classification Manual (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov. Printing
Office, 1972).
2. The R&D and sales data are taken from National Science Foundation, National Patterns
ofScience and Technology Resources, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov. Printing Office, 1982).
3. Technically, we measured the amount of national income attributed to each industry,
without capital consumption allowances, in real terms. The deflators used are taken from the
implicit price deflators for major categories of gross national product, 1972 = 100.
4. To determine whether a given industry has been growing or declining, we fit the data to
the following equation:
Yit =

where:

Yit

t
CURt
e it

Pn

f3io + f3n t + /3i2 CURt+ Eit

= real income produced by industry i over time
= 0,1, ... ,12; 0 in 1970
=capacity utilization rate
= random error term for industry i
=the estimated trend for industry i over the period from 1970 to 1982

5. To determine this trend the original model is used with full-time equivalent employees
replacing real income as the dependent variable.
6. Robert F. Dieli, "Employment: One: Year Later," Continental Comment, December 30,
1983, p. 1.
7. William H. Miller, "The Phony War Between High Tech and Low Tech," Industry Week,
October 3, 1983, p. 39.
8. The equation used in this section is similar to the one developed above, except that the
ratio of industry income to national income replaces industry income as the dependent variable and CURt is not included as an independent variable.
9. A similar position has been reached by Robert Z. Lawrence, "Changes in U.S. Industrial
Structure: The Role of Global Forces, Secular Trends and Transitory Cycles," in Industrial
Change and Public Policy, ed. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Kansas City, Mo.: Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1984), pp. 29-77.
10. See Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Future of Business Regulation (New York: Amacom,
1980).
11. Murray L. Weidenbaum and Reno Hamish, Government Credit Subsidies for Energy
Development (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), pp. 15-17; Arthur
Denzau and Clifford Hardin, Why Resurrect the RFC? (St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, formal publication no. 62, 1984).
12. Miller, p. 39.
13. John Holusha, "Deere & Co. Leads the Way in 'Flexible' Manufacturing," Des Moines
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15. Ibid.

16

